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NOTES
INDEMNIFICATION OR COMPARATIVE FAULT: SHOULD
A TORTFEASOR'S RIGHT TO RECEIVE "RYAN
INDEMNITY" IN MARITIME LAW SINK OR SWIM IN THE
PRESENCE OF COMPARATIVE FAULT?
George K. Fuiaxis*
INTRODUCTION
Maritime law, like any other body of law, requires uniformity to
function most effectively. This concept of uniformity is especially sig-
nificant when defining the relationship between shipowners,' steve-
dore-contractors,2 longshoremen,3 and seamen.4 Difficulty arises,
however, when seamen raise claims against shipowners under the doc-
trines of unseaworthiness and Jones Act negligence. In such in-
stances, different circuits are treating similar cases in a disparate
manner.
Traditionally, maritime law recognized two claims by seamen who
were injured during the course of their employment: (1) maintenance
and cure; and (2) unseaworthiness.5 Under maintenance and cure,
owners or operators are absolutely liable for seamen's personal injury
or death in the service of the ship.6 Seamen may recover food, lodg-
ing, medical care, and unearned wages from their employers while re-
cuperating, either aboard ship or ashore, from a sickness or injury
incurred upon a vessel or even ashore on liberty.7 Under the unsea-
worthiness doctrine, shipowners are absolutely liable for any breach
of the nondelegable duty to maintain a seaworthy vessel.' Seamen
may recover compensation for past and future loss of income, pain
* This Note is the product of the many ideals that have been instilled within me
from my father, Konstantinos G. Fuiaxis, who shines down on me from heaven above;
and my mother, Anna Fuiaxis, who stands by my side and helps me through life's
struggles. I would like to take this moment to share one of my ideals with my readers:
Justice can only be maintained when the divine element remains within us and we are
not influenced by aggression, violence, or greed.
1. A shipowner, within the context of this Note, is a person or corporation that
owns or operates a vessel.
2. A stevedore-contractor, who hires longshoremen, enters into contracts with
shipowners to perform various services.
3. A longshoreman is a maritime employee who loads and unloads cargo ships
and is covered by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
4. A seaman is a person who works on a ship and is employed by a shipowner.
5. See California Home Brands, Inc. v. Ferreira, 871 F.2d 830,832 (9th Cir. 1989).
6. See Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 527 (1938).
7. See Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 517-18 (1949); Calmar, 303 U.S. at
528; Alier v. Sea Land Serv., Inc., 465 F. Supp. 1106, 1109 (D.P.R. 1979); Warren v.
United States, 75 F. Supp. 836, 838 (D. Mass. 1948).
8. See Knight v. Alaska Trawl Fisheries, Inc., 154 F3d 1042, 1044 (9th Cir. 1998).
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and suffering, disability, expenses of medical care, and loss of enjoy-
ment of activities of normal life if their death or personal injury was
caused by the unseaworthiness of the ship.9 The Supreme Court ex-
tended the unseaworthiness cause of action to longshoremen in Seas
Shipping Co. v. Sieracki. °
Congress changed this traditional framework, with respect to
seamen only, by enacting the Jones Act in 1920.11 The Jones Act ex-
panded seamen's rights by giving them a cause of action against ship-
owners in negligence.'" The Act, however, limited recovery to
pecuniary losses suffered during the seamen's lifetime. 3
When stevedore-contractors negligently perform their duties
aboard a vessel, they may create unseaworthy conditions on that ves-
sel.14 Nonetheless, prior to 1956, shipowners continued to be held ab-
solutely liable to seamen and longshoremen for injuries that arose
from these conditions. Shipowners could not receive contribution or
indemnity from stevedore-contractors because a shipowner's duty to
provide a seaworthy ship was absolute and nondelegable. Therefore,
under these circumstances, shipowners bore the costs of the negligent
acts of third parties. The Supreme Court corrected this inequity in
Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp. 5 The Court
held that stevedore-contractors impliedly warrant the workmanlike
performance of their employees in every contract between maritime
contractors and shipowners.16 If the stevedore-contractor breaches
this warranty, then the shipowner may seek indemnification from the
stevedore-contractor for the amount paid in damages to longshore-
men. 7 This doctrine is known as "Ryan indemnity." In 1972, how-
ever, Congress eliminated the unseaworthiness cause of action for
longshoremen and the ability of shipowners to receive indemnification
from stevedore-contractors in longshoremen lawsuits.' 8 Thus, Ryan
was partially superseded by statute.
Although Ryan indemnity is no longer available to shipowners in
longshoremen suits, many federal courts continue to apply it in
9. See Andrew Hoang Do, Seaman Remedies and Maritime Releases: A Practical
Consideration, 7 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. 379, 390 (1995).
10. 328 U.S. 85, 95 (1946).
11. The Jones Act, ch. 250, § 32, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920) (codified as amended at 46
U.S.C. § 688 (1994)).
12. See id.
13. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990).
14. See infra notes 152-55 and accompanying text (discussing the duties of a steve-
dore-contractor).
15. 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
16. See id. at 133-34.
17. See id. at 131-32.
18. The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments
of 1972, Pub. L. 92-576, § 18(a), 86 Stat. 1251, 1263 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 905(b)
(1994)).
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seamen unseaworthiness actions.19 Nevertheless, courts doing so have
prevented shipowners from receiving Ryan indemnity when seamen
raise claims solely under the Jones Act.2" These courts reason that a
Jones Act cause of action is based in negligence, which is distinct from
a shipowner's absolute duty to provide a seaworthy ship.21 On the
other hand, courts generally allow a shipowner to recover Ryan in-
demnity from a negligent stevedore-contractor when a seaman suc-
ceeds on a claim of unseaworthiness against a shipowner, because the
stevedore-contractor's warranty of workmanlike performance is still
present under this cause of action. 22
The circuit courts disagree on whether a shipowner who is liable to
a seaman for both unseaworthiness and Jones Act negligence may re-
ceive indemnification from a negligent stevedore-contractor.23 Courts
that continue to apply Ryan indemnity in this situation justify their
reasoning on the theory that the stevedore-contractor still has an im-
plied contractual duty to perform its obligations in a workmanlike
manner despite the negligence claim, as well as the fact that he is bet-
ter situated than the shipowner to avoid the danger aboard vessels.24
On the other hand, the circuit courts that reject Ryan indemnity have
approved of a comparative fault system, where damages are allocated
between the stevedore-contractor and shipowner according to their
relative degree of fault.'
This Note looks at the development of this circuit split and proposes
a solution to it. Part I of this Note discusses relevant admiralty reme-
dies. Part II examines Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship
Corp., 26 whereby the Supreme Court attempted to eliminate the ineq-
uity that existed for shipowners who were held absolutely liable to
longshoremen for injuries that arose from unseaworthy conditions
created by stevedore-contractors. Part 11 also explains the statutory
repeal of Ryan as applied to longshoremen, and the revision of the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of 1972
("LHWCA"). 27 Part III discusses the effect of the 1972 LHWCA
amendments on seamen's personal injury cases. Further, part III in-
vestigates the current circuit split, and it queries whether a shipowner
who is liable to a seaman for unseaworthiness and Jones Act negli-
gence should be indemnified by a negligent stevedore-contractor. Fi-
19. See infra note 246 (noting that several circuit courts recognize the continued
vitality of Ryan indemnity for shipowners in seamen cases).
20. See Knight v. Alaska Trawl Fisheries, Inc., 154 F.3d 1042, 1044-45 (9th Cir.
1998).
21. See California Home Brands, Inc. v. Ferreira, 871 F.2d 830,836 (9th Cir. 1989).
22. See Knight, 154 F.3d at 1045-46.
23. See id.
24. See Oglebay Norton Co. v. CSX Corp., 788 F.2d 361, 365 (6th Cir. 1986).
25. See Knight, 154 F.3d at 1046-47.
26. 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
27. See 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1994).
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nally, this part concludes that maritime law can continue to maintain
the doctrine of Ryan indemnity in certain circumstances while further
expanding comparative fault principles to maritime personal injury ac-
tions by proportioning fault between shipowner and stevedore-
contractor.
I. REMEDIES AVAILABLE FOR PERSONAL
INJURIES IN MARITIME LAW
To analyze the proper role of Ryan indemnity and comparative
fault in maritime personal injury actions, it is necessary to review the
remedies available to longshoremen and seamen. This part examines
four remedies for personal injury in maritime law: the traditional
claim of maintenance and cure by seamen against the shipowner, the
traditional and modern forms of unseaworthiness, seamen's negli-
gence cause of action under the Jones Act, and longshoremen's com-
pensation recovery under the LHWCA.
A. Maintenance and Cure
Maintenance and cure has been applied in United States maritime
law for over 200 years, and it remains relatively unchanged from its
medieval origins.28 According to the doctrine of maintenance and
28. See Arthur Browne, A Compendious View of the Civil Law and of the Law of
the Admiralty 182-84 (1803). In Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 482-83 (C.C.D.
Me. 1823) (No. 6047), Justice Story, sitting as Circuit Judge, was the first to formally
acknowledge the right to maintenance and cure. As one commentator analyzing the
case observed:
Justice Story saw seamen as "wards of the admiralty," depicting them as
poor and friendless individuals who suffered under harsh and dangerous liv-
ing conditions. As a consequence of the severe conditions of the seafaring
life, Justice Story declared that seamen needed the protection of mainte-
nance and cure. Fearing that shipowners would try to take advantage of
seamen's inexperience and coerce them to sign unfavorable contracts, Jus-
tice Story reasoned that seamen needed courts to act as their guardians
against shipowners. Justice Story supported the granting of maintenance
and cure by explaining that a seaman's pay alone was usually insufficient to
meet the expenses of illness. Without monetary aid from shipowners, Justice
Story suggested, seamen faced hardship or even death, particularly when
their illness caused them to be discharged in a foreign port.
Justice Story found that certain benefits arose to both shipowners and
seamen from holding shipowners liable for their employees' welfare. First,
requiring shipowners to bear the expenses of maintenance and cure would
encourage them to provide safer working environments, thereby reducing
the number of accidents. The diminished number of accidents would de-
crease the number of seamen requesting maintenance and cure, and the
shipowner would therefore expend less money on maintenance and cure
payments. Second, providing maintenance and cure constitutes good public
policy because, if seamen know that the shipowner will pay for work-related
injuries, the seamen may more willingly enter the profession and face the
dangerous tasks inherent in seafaring.
Virginia A. McDaniel, Note, Recognizing Modern Maintenance and Cure as an Adni-
ralty Right, 14 Fordham Int'l L.J. 669, 673-74 (1990-91) (footnotes omitted).
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cure, an owner or operator of a vessel is absolutely liable for a sea-
man's injury or illness;29 proof of any negligence on the part of the
shipowner is unnecessary.30 Specifically, the doctrine requires that an
employer pay for a seaman's food, lodging, medical care,31 and
unearned wages32 while the seaman is recovering aboard ship or
ashore from a sickness or injury incurred while in the service of the
vessel.33 "Maintenance" is the sick or injured seaman's right to re-
ceive an adequate amount of money to purchase food and lodging,
which is equivalent to what he would have received aboard the ship.3
The amount that the seaman may recover is a question of fact.35 A
seaman may use the value of comparable meals and lodging expenses
in the area he lives or works as evidence of the appropriate amount he
should receive.36 If a seaman fails to present evidence of his expenses,
most jurisdictions will provide him with a pre-ordained amount.3 7
Further, the seaman must actually suffer expenses to recover mainte-
29. See Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 527 (1938); Richard Brett Kelly,
Note, Maintenance and Cure: The Courts as Thy Brother's Keeper: Barnes v.
Andover Co., 16 Tul. Mar. L. 225, 226 (1991) ("Under most circumstances, a ship-
owner is strictly liable to seamen in his employ for maintenance and cure." (footnote
omitted)). There are, of course, exceptions to this rule of strict liability:
The duty of the seaman's employer to pay maintenance and cure is almost
absolute. Only an act of wanton or willful misconduct will bar the seaman
from recovering. Basically, the acts that bar recovery are ones of which soci-
ety disapproves: intoxication, contraction of venereal diseases, or injury in-
curred while negotiating for sexual services.
Gary Michael Haugen, Comment, Maintenance and Cure: Contract Right or Legal
Obligation?, 62 Tul. L. Rev. 625, 628 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
30. See Harden, 11 F. Cas. at 482-83; see also The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175
(1903) (stating that "the vessel and her owners are liable, in case a seaman falls sick,
or is wounded, in the service of the ship, to the extent of his maintenance and cure,
and to his wages, at least so long as the voyage is continued"); John B. Shields,
Seamen's Rights to Recover Maintenance and Cure Benefits, 55 Tul. L Rev. 1046, 1046
(1981) ("Maintenance and cure is a time-honored right granted by the general mari-
time law to seamen who become ill or injured in the service of the ship.").
31. When a seaman refuses an offer for free medical care, he may lose his right to
maintenance and cure. See Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 737 (1961).
32. See Do, supra note 9, at 386 ("Unearned wages are those wages the seaman
would have received until the end of the voyage, or the end of the period or season
for which he was employed had he not become sick or injured."); Haugen. supra note
29, at 627 ("[A] seaman may recover lost wages until the completion of the voyage
during which he was injured or until attaining maximum medical recovery." (foot-
notes omitted)).
33. See Haugen, supra note 29, at 625.
34. See Calnar, 303 U.S. at 527-28.
35. See Caulfield v. AC & D Marine, Inc., 633 F.2d 1129, 1132 (5th Cir. Unit A
1981).
36. See id.; see also Gardiner v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 786 F.2d 943, 946 (9th Cir.
1986) (stating that seamen are traditionally provided with their actual out-of-pocket
expenses); Rutherford v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1365, 1369-70 (N.D. Cal.
1983) (observing that United States courts, using the traditional method, award main-
tenance and cure on the basis of actual costs to seamen).
37. See Grant Gilmore & Charles L. Black, Jr., The Law of Admiralty § 6-12, at
307 (2d ed. 1975).
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nance. 38 For example, a seaman will not receive maintenance if he is
hospitalized39 or living with his family.4° "Cure," on the other hand, is
the sick or injured seaman's right to receive medical care until he has
reached maximum medical recovery.41 The employer must pay for
medical care from the date of sickness or injury until the seaman has
been cured or, alternatively, until he is diagnosed incurable.42
A shipowner's obligation to furnish maintenance and cure extends
to injuries a seaman suffers while that seaman is in the service of the
ship.43 The term "in the service of the ship" includes the time that a
seaman is working aboard the ship and any time that he is "subject to
the call of duty."44 For example, when the ship docks and the seaman
is granted shore leave, he must answer to the call of the shipowner,
and, therefore, he is still in the service of the ship and entitled to
maintenance and cure.45 This is true even if a seaman seeks relaxation
when the ship docks, because courts recognize the long hours
that a seaman is confined to his ship.46 When a seaman leaves
38. See Spanos v. The Lily, 261 F.2d 214, 215 (4th Cir. 1958).
39. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46, 50 (1948).
40. See Nichols v. Barwick, 792 F.2d 1520, 1524 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that a
seaman does not receive maintenance when he lives with his parents); Harper v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 741 F.2d 87, 91 (5th Cir. 1984) (finding that a seaman is not
entitled to maintenance when he lives at home with his wife and children).
41. See Vella v. Ford Motor Co., 421 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1975); Farrell v. United States,
336 U.S. 511, 517-18 (1949); Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 531-32 (1938);
Cox v. Dravo Corp., 517 F.2d 620, 627 (3d Cir. 1975).
42. See Vella, 421 U.S. at 4-6; Shields, supra note 30, at 1047-48.
43. See Farrell, 336 U.S. at 516.
44. Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 726, 732 (1943). "[Tlhe seaman,
when he finishes his day's work, is neither relieved of obligations to his employer nor
wholly free to dispose of his leisure as he sees fit .... [M]aintenance and cure extends
beyond injuries sustained [by a seaman] ... while engaged in activities required by his
employment." Id. at 731-32. For two other Supreme Court decisions in which mainte-
nance and cure was awarded to a seaman although he was not carrying out any activi-
ties connected to his employment at the time of the injury, see Warren v. United
States, 340 U.S. 523, 529 (1951) (holding that "maintenance and cure extends to inju-
ries occurring while the seaman is departing on or returning from shore leave though
he has at the time no duty to perform for the ship"), and Farrell v. United States, 336
U.S. 511, 516 (1949) (stating that the seaman could recover maintenance and cure
even though he was ashore because he was "in the service of the ship" and "answer-
able to its call to duty").
45. See Barnes v. Andover Co., 900 F.2d 630, 633 (3d Cir. 1990).
46. In Aguilar, the Court made the following observation:
To relieve the shipowner of his obligation in the case of injuries incurred on
shore leave would cast upon the seaman hazards encountered only by reason
of the voyage. The assumption is hardly sound that the normal uses and
purposes of shore leave are "exclusively personal" and have no relation to
the vessel's business. Men cannot live for long cooped up aboard ship, with-
out substantial impairment of their efficiency, if not also serious danger to
discipline. Relaxation beyond the confines of the ship is necessary if the
work is to go on, more so that it may move smoothly. No master would take
a crew to sea if he could not grant shore leave, and no crew would be taken
if it could never obtain it. Even more for the seaman than for the landsman,
therefore, "the superfluous is the necessary.., to make life livable" and to
1614 [Vol. 67
1999] RYAN INDEMNITY & COMPARATIVE FAULT
the ship against orders, however, the shipowner's duty termin-
ates.47
Maintenance and cure is justified because the ship serves as the sea-
man's home, entitling the seaman to receive food and lodging, even
during illness.' The seaman has the burden of proving that his injury
or illness occurred during his service to the vessel.49 This burden,
however, is not difficult to satisfy.5" In fact, a seaman's testimony
alone may be sufficient to support a claim for maintenance and cure.5
The maintenance and cure doctrine, therefore, addresses the seaman's
unique isolation and vulnerability to his employer as well as his envi-
ronment. In this context, then, it is no surprise that this remedy favors
seamen.
B. The Traditional Form of Unseaworthiness
Unlike maintenance and cure, courts did not recognize the doctrine
of unseaworthiness until the late 1800s. After several lower courts
held that the unseaworthiness of a vessel was a possible cause of ac-
tion for injured seamen,52 the Supreme Court recognized the doctrine
in 1903. In The Osceola,5 3 a seaman brought an action against his em-
ployer, who owned the vessel, to recover damages for an injury sus-
tained while aboard the vessel.54 The master of the vessel had
ordered the crew to raise the gangway by using the derrick. 55 Mem-
bers of the crew began to execute the master's order, but the gangway,
by the force of the wind, upturned the derrick and injured the plain-
tiff.56 Without very much elaboration, the Court stated that a ship-
owner could be held liable to a seaman for injuries that resulted from
get work done. In short, shore leave is an elemental necessity in the sailing
of ships, a part of the business as old as the art, not merely a personal
diversion.
318 U.S. at 733-34 (footnote omitted).
47. See id at 733; see also Haugen, supra note 29, at 628 (setting forth exceptions
to a seaman's recovery under maintenance and cure); supra note 31 (stating that a
seaman may lose his right to maintenance and cure when he refuses an offer for free
medical care).
48. See McDaniel, supra note 28, at 669; see also Kelly, supra note 29, at 225 (ob-
serving that maintenance and cure "provides an injured seaman the same sustenance
he would have received aboard ship").
49. See Miller v. Lykes Bros.-Ripley S.S. Co., 98 F.2d 185, 186 (5th Cir. 1938).
50. See Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 523 (1957).
51. See Yelverton v. Mobile Labs., Inc., 782 F.2d 555, 558 (5th Cir. 1986).
52. See, e.g., City of Alexandria, 17 F. 390, 392-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1883) (finding that a
vessel owner is liable for negligence when the ship or the ship's appliances are
unseaworthy).
53. 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
54. See id at 159.
55. See id. A derrick is a "hoisting apparatus consisting of a boom carrying a
tackle at its outer end and pivoted at the other, often to the foot of a central mast,
used [aboard ship] for unloading." Webster's Dictionary 259 (Int'l ed. 1995).
56. See The Osceola, 189 U.S. at 159.
1615
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the unseaworthiness of the ship.57 The Court, however, required that
the seaman show negligence on the part of the shipowner to recover
on an unseaworthiness theory.58 The Court drew no distinction be-
tween injuries arising from unseaworthiness and negligence.59 While
the Court was unclear on the details of an unseaworthiness cause of
action and offered little guidance on how it should be applied, deci-
sions subsequent to the enactment of the Jones Act eventually altered
and refined the doctrine.6 °
C. Jones Act Negligence
Under traditional maritime law, seamen could not bring a negli-
gence cause of action against their employer or their fellow employ-
ees.61 In response to this concern, Congress passed the Jones Act in
1920,62 which gave seamen a cause of action against their employers
based in negligence.63 The Jones Act superseded The Osceola, which
held that seamen could recover damages for injuries that resulted
from unseaworthiness, but not negligence.64 Congress created a uni-
form system of seamen's tort law by incorporating the exact language
of the Federal Employer's Liability Act 65 ("FELA") of interstate rail-
way carriers into the Jones Act.66 Although the Jones Act did not
specify the amount of damages seamen could recover, it provided
seamen with the substantive recovery provisions of FELA.67 Because
courts have interpreted FELA to allow recovery only for pecuniary
57. See id. at 175; see also infra notes 82-114 and accompanying text (discussing
the modern form of unseaworthiness as applied to seamen and then to
longshoremen).
58. See The Osceola, 189 U.S. at 173-74 (stating that "if there were any negligence
on the part of the [shipowner], it appears to have been not providing proper appli-
ances, so that the case was one really of unseaworthiness"). At the time of The Osce-
ola, seamen were not afforded a separate negligence remedy. See id.
59. See id. at 174.
60. See infra notes 82-114 and accompanying text.
61. See Do, supra note 9, at 387.
62. The Jones Act, ch. 250, § 32, 41 Stat. 988, 1006-07 (1920) (codified as amended
at 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1994)).
63. The Jones Act states, in pertinent part:
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employ-
ment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the
right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States
modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal
injury to railway employees shall apply .... Jurisdiction in such actions shall
be under the court of the district in which the defendant employer resides or
in which his principal office is located.
46 U.S.C. § 688 (1994).
64. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 29 (1990); see also supra notes
57-59 and accompanying text (discussing that a shipowner could be held liable to a
seaman for injuries resulting from unseaworthiness).
65. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51, 53, 54, 56, 59 (1994). FELA created a uniform national law
applicable to injuries and accidents suffered by railway employees.
66. See Miles, 498 U.S. at 29.
67. See id. at 32.
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loss, 68 maritime courts, in turn, have applied this limitation to Jones
Act negligence claims. 6 9 Further, the Jones Act/FELA survival provi-
sion limits a seaman's recovery to losses suffered during the seaman's
lifetime.7' Under these provisions, the federal courts have provided
seamen with numerous damages claims, including compensation for
past and future loss of income, pain and suffering, disability, expenses
of medical care, and loss of enjoyment of normal life activities.7" As
discussed below, however, longshoremen were not permitted to share
in these benefits; they were limited to their compensation recovery
under the LHWCA.
D. The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
Prior to the creation of the LHWCA, states attempted to apply
their workers' compensation laws to longshoremen. 2 The Supreme
Court, however, held that application of these statutes to longshore-
men was unconstitutional,7 3 because the power to amend maritime
law rests with Congress, not the states.74 In response, Congress estab-
lished the LHWCA to ensure uniformity in longshoremen compensa-
tion recovery. As originally enacted by Congress in 1927, the
LHWCA provided that the stevedore-contractor's liability for com-
pensation was "exclusive and in place of all other liability" to the in-
jured longshoreman.76 While Congress modeled the L VCA on
New York's Workmen's Compensation Act,' recovery for longshore-
68. See Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 69-71 (1913).
69. See Miles, 498 U.S. at 32 ("The Jones Act applies when a seaman has been
killed as a result of negligence, and it limits recovery to pecuniary loss.").
70. See id. at 36 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 59).
71. See Do, supra note 9, at 388.
72. See Gordon K. Wright et al., The Ship, Stevedore, and Longshore Worker Tri-
angle 1917-1995, 26 J. Mar. L. & Com. 503, 504 (1995).
73. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 217-18 (1917).
74. See Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 225-26 (1924).
75. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
76. Id. § 905(a). While the LHWCA claimed that the remedies it afforded were
"exclusive," see id-, it also expressly provided a right of election to proceed against
any person other than the employer who is liable for damages. According to section
933(a) of the Act:
If on account of a disability or death for which compensation is payable
under this [Act] the person entitled to such compensation determines that
some person other than the employer... is liable in damages, he need not
elect whether to receive such compensation or to recover damages against
such third person.
Id. § 933(a).
The LHWCA was amended in 1972 to provide longshoremen with increased com-
pensation benefits and a negligence cause of action against shipowners. See infra
notes 198-211 and accompanying text.
77. See Wright, supra note 72, at 505.
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men under the LHWCA differed extensively from New York's act.7
The LHWCA placed a fixed limit-seventy dollars per week-on the
recovery longshoremen could receive from workers' compensation.79
Longshoremen's ability to recover damages under the LHWCA, how-
ever, dramatically expanded with the creation of the modern form of
unseaworthiness developed in Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandangert0 and
its progeny.
E. The Modern Form of Unseaworthiness
As traditionally constituted, the unseaworthiness cause of action in
maritime law required a showing of negligence for seamen to recover
damages.81 The Supreme Court altered the unseaworthiness doctrine
after Congress enacted the Jones Act in 1920, most likely because the
traditional concept of unseaworthiness was no longer necessary as it,
too, was based in negligence. In Carlisle, the Supreme Court made its
first effort to detach the concept of negligence from a remedy of un-
seaworthiness.8 2 In that case, the plaintiff seaman was injured by an
explosion while on the defendant's motorboat.8 3 The injury occurred
when the plaintiff poured a can of gasoline, which he believed to be
coal oil (a relatively innocuous liquid), upon the firewood in a small
stove that was used to cook meals and heat water.' He applied a
match to the firewood, which ignited the gasoline and caused an ex-
plosion that seriously burned his body. 5 He alleged that the defend-
ant or the defendant's agents negligently substituted the gasoline for
the coal oil without the plaintiff's knowledge. 6 The trial court held
that "the basis of the action [was] negligence" and entered judgment
for the plaintiff.8 7 The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's decision. 8 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court af-
firmed the judgment.8 9 The Court acknowledged, however, that it
may be possible for the unseaworthiness doctrine to apply without
78. See Donald S. Morton, Comment, The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act: Coverage After the 1972 Amendments, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 99, 100
(1976).
79. See James R. Thompson, Duty Owed by Shipowner Under 1972 Amendments
to Longshoremen's Act Is That of Land Based Premises Owner to Business Invitee, 6 J.
Mar. L. & Com. 643, 647 (1975).
80. 259 U.S. 255 (1922).
81. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional form
of unseaworthiness, which required a showing of negligence on the part of the ship-
owner to recover).
82. See Carlisle, 259 U.S. at 259.
83. See id. at 257.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. Id. at 258 (internal quotation omitted).
88. See id. at 257.
89. See id. at 260.
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showing that the shipowner was negligent. 0 As the Court observed,
"we think the trial court might have told the jury that without regard
to negligence the vessel was unseaworthy when she left the dock...
and that if thus unseaworthy and one of the crew received damage as
the direct result thereof, he was entitled to recover compensatory
damages."'"
In Mahnich v. Southern Steamship Co.92 the Court took a step fur-
ther and explicitly recognized that negligence is not an element of a
seaman's unseaworthiness claim.93 In Mahnich, the mate had ordered
the plaintiff seaman to paint the bridge.94 To do so, the plaintiff had
to use the staging, which was composed of a wooden board held aloft
at both ends by rope.95 The rope that supported the board was rotten,
and it could not sustain the weight of the plaintiff.96 The rope broke,
and the plaintiff was injured when he fell. 97 The Court held that the
vessel was "unseaworthy in the sense that it was inadequate for the
purpose for which it was ordinarily used .... Its inadequacy rendered
it unseaworthy, whether the mate's failure to observe the defect was
negligent or unavoidable." 98 Thus, negligence was no longer an issue
in a seaworthiness analysis.99 In 1946, the Court affirmed this princi-
ple in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,1' and it cited both Carlisle Pack-
ing and Mahnich in the process. 01
Under the modern unseaworthiness doctrine, the owner of a ship is
held absolutely liable for breach of its nondelegable duty to provide a
seaworthy vessel. 10 2 A seaman may recover lost wages, medical ex-
90. See id. at 259-60.
91. Id. at 259.
92. 321 U.S. 96 (1944). The Court stated that unseaworthiness is unaffected by the
negligence of the shipowner. See id. at 100.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 97.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. Id. at 103.
99. See id.
100. 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
101. See id. at 94-95 & n.11 (stating that unseaworthiness is not founded in negli-
gence and therefore may not be defeated by the common law defenses of contributory
negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow servant rule); see also Joseph C. Savino,
Personal Injury/Negligence" Standard of Care Owed by Shipowners to Longshoremen
Under the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensa-
tion Act, 13 J. Mar. L. & Com. 111, 111 n.9 (1981) ("Unseaworthiness, a type of strict
liability, does not necessarily mean that the defective condition be of such a quality as
to render the entire vessel unfit for the purpose for which it was intended.").
102. See Knight v. Alaska Trawl Fisheries, Inc., 154 F.3d 1042, 1044 (9th Cir. 1998).
In Marshall v. Manese, 85 F.2d 944 (4th Cir. 1936), the Fourth Circuit observed:
Seamen are the wards of admiralty, and the policy of the maritime law has
ever been to see that they are accorded proper protection by the vessels on
which they serve. In early days, this protection was sufficiently accorded by
the enforcement of the right of "maintenance and cure." Vessels and their
appliances were of comparatively simple construction, and seamen were in
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penses, pain and suffering, and compensation for disability when his
death or personal injury is based on the unseaworthiness of the
ship." 3 The shipowner is not obligated to provide an accident-free
ship that will withstand all the perils at sea,"° nor is he required to
"furnish the very latest, best or most modem equipment."' 5 The
owner of the vessel must, however, provide seamen with safe, seawor-
thy appliances so that the seamen may perform their work free from
avoidable dangers.1 16 A vessel and its appliances are seaworthy when
they are reasonably fit for their intended service.10 7 The term "rea-
sonably fit" is determined by the standards that would be applied by a
reasonable shipowner.10 8 The shipowner's adherence to the customs
and practices of the industry, however, by itself, will not discharge his
duty to provide a seaworthy ship. 10 9 In addition, the nondelegable,
absolute obligation of a shipowner to provide a seaworthy ship has
been applied beyond the vessel itself to impose liability for unsuitable
clothing," 0 an unfit crew,"' improper loading or stowage of cargo,' 1 2
quite as good position ordinarily to judge of the seaworthiness of a vessel as
were her owners.
With the advent of steam navigation, however, it was realized, at least in
this country, that "maintenance and cure" did not afford to injured seamen
adequate compensation in all cases for injuries sustained. Vessels were no
longer the simple sailing ships, of whose seaworthiness the sailor was an ade-
quate judge, but were full of complicated and dangerous machinery, the op-
eration of which required the use of many and varied appliances and a high
degree of technical knowledge. The seaworthiness of the vessel could be
ascertained only upon an examination of this machinery and appliances by
skilled experts. It was accordingly held that the duty of the vessel and her
owners to the seaman, in this new age of navigation, extended beyond mere
"maintenance and cure," which had been sufficient in the simple age of sail-
ing ships; that the owners owed to the seamen the duty of furnishing a sea-
worthy vessel and safe and proper appliances in good order and condition;
and that for failure to discharge such duty there was liability on the part of
the vessel and her owners to a seaman suffering injury as a result thereof.
Id. at 945-46.
103. See Do, supra note 9, at 390.
104. See Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960).
105. Moomey v. Little Boy, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 4, 8 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
106. See Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 104 (1944).
107. See Mitchell, 362 U.S. at 550.
108. See Allen v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 623 F.2d 355, 359-60 (5th Cir. 1980).
109. See Schlichter v. Port Arthur Towing Co., 288 F.2d 801, 804 (5th Cir. 1961).
The Fifth Circuit, in Walker v. Harris, 335 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1964), set the following
guidelines to determine when a vessel is unseaworthy:
[W]hat is the vessel to do? What are the hazards, the perils, the forces likely
to be incurred? Is the vessel or the particular fitting under scrutiny, suffi-
cient to withstand those anticipated forces? If the answer is in the affirma-
tive, the vessel (or its fitting) is seaworthy. If the answer is in the negative,
then the vessel (or the fitting) is unseaworthy no matter how diligent, care-
ful, or prudent the owner might have been.
Id. at 191 (citation omitted).
110. See Webb v. Dresser Indus., 536 F.2d 603, 606-07 (5th Cir. 1976).
111. See Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336, 339-40 (1955).
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poor transitory conditions," 3 and defective equipment and appliances
brought aboard by others. 4
The difference between negligence and unseaworthiness theories is
that negligence requires proof of fault," 5 while unseaworthiness re-
quires proof of a defective condition on the vessel.11 6 Under an un-
seaworthiness theory, seamen are not required to prove who was
specifically at fault for the creation of the defect. 1 7 The shipowner's
obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel is independent of the obliga-
tion to exercise reasonable care. 18 While the seaworthiness of a ves-
sel is determined by a reasonable shipowner standard, and not by the
strict standards of the Jones Act," 9 the types of claims that succeed
under unseaworthiness and negligence theories are nonetheless simi-
lar. Examples of Jones Act negligence include the failure to provide
safety rules or to require the use of safety gear,120 the failure to make
inspections,' 2 ' the failure to provide and maintain reasonably safe
equipment and appliances,'" and the issuance of negligent orders, in-
structions, or suggestions by supervisors."2 Examples of unseaworthi-
ness include an improper or unreasonably dangerous method of
operation, 124 an undermanned and incompetent crew," the failure to
provide sufficient safety equipment,126 and a crewmember creating an
unsafe condition by making safe equipment unsafe. 27
F. Application of the Unseaworthiness Doctrine to Longshoremen
The Supreme Court's decision in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki"l
gave longshoremen the right to bring unseaworthiness actions against
shipowners. 129 Sieracki, an employee of an independent stevedoring
firm that was under contract to load Seas Shipping Company's vessel,
112. See Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206, 215 (1963); Atlantic &
Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 363-64 (1962).
113. See Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 549-50 (1960).
114. See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 87 (1946).
115. See Cox v. Esso Shipping Co., 247 F.2d 629, 637 (5th Cir. 1957).
116. See Sieracki, 328 U.S. at 94-95; Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 103
(1944).
117. See Sieracki, 328 U.S. at 94.
118. See Mitchell, 362 U.S. at 549; Joyce v. Atlantic Ritchfield Co., 651 F2d 676, 681
(10th Cir. 1981).
119. See Allen v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 623 F.2d 355, 359-60 (5th Cir. 1980).
120. See Schlichter v. Port Arthur Towing Co., 288 F.2d 801, 806 (5th Cir. 1961)
(finding that the shipowner was not negligent because he provided safe gear).
121. See Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc, 364 U.S. 325, 328-30 (1960).
122. See Puamier v. Barge BT 1793, 395 F. Supp. 1019, 1031-32 (E.D. Va. 1974).
123. See Ives v. United States, 58 F.2d 201, 202 (2d Cir. 1932).
124. See Morales v. City of Galveston, 370 U.S. 165, 170 (1962).
125. See American President Lines, Ltd. v. Welch, 377 F.2d 501, 504 (9th Cir. 1967).
126. See Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255, 258 (1922).
127. See Allen v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 623 F.2d 355, 364 (5th Cir. 1980).
128. 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
129. See id- at 97.
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was injured by defective equipment on board. 131 The Court held that
a longshoreman-employee who worked on a ship is entitled to the
benefit of the shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness.13 1 Under these
circumstances, the Court reasoned that longshoremen, like seamen,
were exposed to the dangers of unseaworthy conditions, and that they
should therefore be equally entitled to the unseaworthiness cause of
action.132 The Court found that the shipowner's duty to provide a sea-
worthy vessel was not "confined to seamen who perform the ship's
service under immediate hire to the owner, but extends to those who
render it with his consent or by his arrangement."'133 Further, the
Court rejected the argument that, by giving longshoremen compensa-
tion that was "exclusive,' 34 the LHWCA barred longshoremen from
invoking an unseaworthiness cause of action as well. 135 As the Court
observed, the LHWCA specifically provided that a longshoreman
could bring suit against anyone other than his employer if such person
was liable to him for damages, and therefore, the LHWCA does not
"nullify any right of the longshoreman against the owner of the
ship."' 36 The Court also observed that, "liability arises as an incident,
not merely of the seaman's contract, but of performing the ship's ser-
vice with the owner's consent.' 37 Therefore, under Sieracki, long-
shoremen could recover full damages from the owner of the ship if
their injuries were caused by an unseaworthy condition of the
vessel.' 38
The grant of an unseaworthiness cause of action to longshoremen,
in conjunction with the removal of negligence as an element of the
unseaworthiness cause of action, made it much easier for plaintiffs to
recover damages. At the same time, however, it resulted in a dispro-
portionate increase in the liability of shipowners, who were held re-
sponsible for the negligence of stevedore-contractors. In Halcyon
Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp.,3 9 the Supreme Court
held that a shipowner could not obtain contribution from a stevedore-
contractor who was also a concurrent tortfeasor. 140 The plaintiff, a
130. See id. at 87.
131. See id. at 95. Longshoremen had to prove only that the shipowner breached
the strict duty to provide workers with a seaworthy ship free of any hazards. See Gil-
more & Black, supra note 37, § 6-44(a), at 401-04.
132. See Sieracki, 328 U.S. at 93-95.
133. Id. at 95.
134. 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (1994).
135. See Sieracki, 328 U.S. at 101.
136. Id. at 102.
137. Id. at 97.
138. See David D. Kammer, Is the Turnover Duty Real, or Just Unseaworthiness in
Disguise?, 61 Def. Couns. J. 260, 260 (1994). Longshoremen received the remedies of
seamen, while maintaining their own LHWCA benefits. See Wright et al., supra note
72, at 506.
139. 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
140. See id. at 285-87.
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longshoreman, brought suit against the shipowner, Halcyon Lines
("Halcyon"), for injuries sustained while the plaintiff was performing
repairs aboard the defendant's ship. 41 Halcyon, in turn, sued Haenn
Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corporation, the stevedore-contractor, as a
third-party defendant and concurrent tortfeasor. 42 Halcyon alleged
that Haenn's negligence contributed to the longshoreman's injuries. 43
The Court refused Halcyon's invitation to apply comparative fault in
maritime personal injury cases,14' concluding that such a decision
rested in the hands of Congress.' 45
Sieracki and Halcyon Lines dramatically increased the scope of lia-
bility for shipowners in maritime cases. Consequently, these decisions
also led to an increase in the number of damage suits brought by long-
shoremen against shipowners.146 The Supreme Court faced increased
pressure from shipowners to rectify this inequity and change the ship-
owners' role as insurers of the conduct of stevedore-contractors. 147
Part II discusses the Court's response to this pressure, namely, the
development of the doctrine known as "Ryan indemnity."
II. RYAN INDEMNITY
This part examines the Supreme Court's decision in Ryan Stevedor-
ing Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp.'48 It discusses the ascent of
Ryan and the application of Ryan indemnity to express disclaimers,
defenses to Ryan indemnity, and the connection between Ryan in-
demnity and the LHWCA. Further, this part explains the statutory
repeal of Ryan indemnity as applied to longshoremen resulting from
Congress's revision of the LHWCA in 1972.
A. The Rise of Ryan
Ryan addressed the perceived inequity that shipowners faced when
held absolutely liable to longshoremen for injuries that arose from an
unseaworthy condition created by stevedore-contractors. In Ryan, the
plaintiff longshoreman sued the shipowner after being injured aboard
a vessel while unloading it.149 The injury occurred when a 3200-pound
roll of pulpboard broke loose because the loading stevedore did not
secure it properly. 50 The district court found the shipowner liable for
141. See id. at 283.
142. See id
143. See id
144. See id. at 284-85.
145. See id. at 285.
146. See Graydon S. Staring, Meting Out Misfortune: How tile Courts Are Allotting
the Costs of Maritime Injury in tie Eighties, 45 La. L. Rev. 907, 909 (1985).
147. See id at 909-10.
148. 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
149. See id at 125_26.
150. See id
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the longshoreman's injuries.' 5 ' The Supreme Court affirmed the Sec-
ond Circuit's reversal of the district court, holding that a stevedore-
contractor impliedly warrants the workmanlike performance of his
employees in every contract between a maritime contractor and a
shipowner.152  According to the Court, if a stevedore-contractor
breaches this implied warranty to perform the work in a reasonably
safe or workmanlike manner, the shipowner could recover indemnifi-
cation from the stevedore-contractor. 153 A finding of stevedore-con-
tractor negligence, therefore, triggers his obligation to indemnify 54
the shipowner for any amount paid to a longshoreman. 155 The Court
compared the indemnification to "a manufacturer's warranty of the
soundness of its manufactured product." 156 Additionally, the Court
151. See id. at 128.
152. See id. at 133-34. Justice Black dissented because, the majority implied an
obligation to indemnify without "a shred of evidence" that the stevedore agreed to do
so. See id. at 141-44 (Black, J., dissenting).
153. See id. at 132; see also Francis J. Gorman, The Choice Between Proportionate
Fault or Ryan Indemnity in Maritime Property Damage Cases, 10 J. Mar. L. & Com.
325, 325 (1979) (stating that "[a] breach of the warranty entitled a shipowner to full
indemnity for any judgment or reasonable settlement amount paid to a third party,
including reimbursement of fees and expenses incurred in defending the third party's
claim"). As one commentator has observed:
By virtue of working cargo on ships daily, stevedores develop expertise in
cargo handling. Stevedores know much better than ships' officers what is
necessary to make the cargo areas and working conditions reasonably safe
for their longshore worker employees. Only the stevedore knows the com-
petency and skill of his employees and what might be hazardous to them.
Wright et al., supra note 72, at 512-13.
154. Indemnity allows the shipowner-indemnitee to shift all of his loss onto the
stevedore-contractor/indemnitor, eliminating the need for contribution. The ship-
owner receives an all-or-nothing recovery from the stevedore. Therefore, the more
powerful party in an indemnity agreement is the shipowner. A shipowner could cause
injuries to a longshoreman or a seaman by his own negligence and then shift the
negligence to the stevedore. In most situations, the stevedore has no opportunity to
bargain with the shipowner in regards to the conditions of the indemnity agreement.
Indemnity agreements, however, are not always express in nature. A stevedore's obli-
gation to perform his work in a competent and safe manner is the basis of the mari-
time service contract and it implies indemnity for the breach of the warranty of
workmanlike performance. See Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350
U.S. 124, 130 (1956).
155. See id. at 130. An attractive feature of Ryan was that the shipowner could
recover counsel fees and litigation expenses as part of his full recoverable damages
caused by a stevedore's breach of contract. See Gorman, supra note 153, at 331-32.
Ryan indemnity was based on the following reasoning:
A "warranty" is an assurance by one party to a contract of the existence of a
fact upon which the other party may rely. It is intended to relieve the prom-
isee of any duty to ascertain the fact for himself, and amounts to a promise
to indemnify the promisee for any loss if the fact warranted proves untrue.
17A C.J.S. Contracts § 342, at 325 (1963) (footnotes omitted); see also Restatement of
Contracts § 334 (1932) ("If a breach of contract is the cause of litigation between the
plaintiff and third parties that the defendant had reason to foresee when the contract
was made, the plaintiff's reasonable expenditures in such litigation are included in
estimating his damages.").
156. Ryan, 350 U.S. at 133-34.
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held that no express oral or written agreement is necessary for a ship-
owner to recover indemnity. 157 Finally, the Court observed that the
shipowner's cause of action against the stevedore-contractor was
grounded in contract rather than tort, even though the duty of reason-
able care in the warranty is similar to that in negligence.158 Ryan
awarded consequential damages for breach of contract, obligating the
stevedore-contractor to discharge "foreseeable damages resulting to
the shipowner from the contractor's improper performance."159
Further, as decisions subsequent to Ryan have observed, the pres-
ence of shipowner negligence, if any, does not necessarily preclude
Ryan indemnity, and the non-negligence of the stevedore-contractor
does not protect him as a matter of law from shipowner indemnifica-
tion.160 Undoubtedly, the rule that held shipowners absolutely liable
to longshoremen under Sieracki became less onerous under Ryan.
1. Ryan's Application Despite Express Disclaimers
After Ryan, some lower courts held that a shipowner could ex-
pressly waive its right to Ryan indemnity through a disclaimer. 161
These disclaimers were seldom enforced, however, because courts
generally required them to be sufficiently "clear and explicit."' 62 For
example, one court concluded that the following disclaimer was not
enforceable: "This contract constitutes the full agreement between
the parties hereto, and no warranty of any nature is to be implied
from any of the wording of this agreement."'163 Other courts have re-
jected express disclaimers on the grounds that they "are not favored
157. See id at 132.
158. See id. at 131-32. "The shipowner's action is not changed from one for a
breach of contract to one for a tort simply because recovery may turn upon the stan-
dard of the performance of petitioner's stevedoring service." Id. at 134 (footnote
omitted). The right of indemnification was founded upon a breach of the contractual
obligation to perform the contract in a reasonably safe manner. See id. at 131-32. As
the Court later observed in a subsequent case, "Although in Ryan the stevedore was
negligent, he was not found liable for negligence as such but because he failed to
perform safely, a basis for liability including negligent and nonnegligent conduct
alike." Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S.
315, 319 (1964).
159. Ryan, 350 U.S. at 129 n.3.
160. See Italia Societa, 376 U.S. at 320; Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410, 414-15
(1963).
161. See Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 336
F.2d 124, 127 (9th Cir.), rev'd, 376 U.S. 315 (1964); United States v. Northern Metal
Co., 379 F. Supp. 1131, 1139-40 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
162. Brattoli v. Kheel, 302 F. Supp. 745, 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). While courts have
upheld agreements where the stevedore promised to hold the shipowner harmless
against the shipowner's own negligence, the language of the contract must be plain
and unambiguous and the contract must indicate the stevedore's intent to indemnify
the shipowner against the shipowner's own fault. See Porche v. Gulf Miss. Marine
Corp., 390 F. Supp. 624, 628 (E.D. La. 1975); Jurisich v. United Gas Pipe Line Co.,
349 F. Supp. 1227, 1229 (E.D. La. 1972).
163. Brattoli, 302 F. Supp. at 752 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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by the courts and must be strictly construed," 164 and that stevedore-
contractors are best situated to adopt protective measures.1 65
On the other hand, in United States v. Northern Metal Co. 1 6 6 the
court enforced a disclaimer that waived a shipowner's right to Ryan
indemnity. The shipowner had brought a suit that sought indemnifica-
tion from a stevedore-contractor for damages incurred by the ship-
owner after the shipowner paid the longshoreman's claim. 167 The
longshoreman received fatal injuries while he was loading cargo when
the port shackle parted and the connecting parts recoiled and dropped
to the after port deck onto the longshoreman. 168 The Eastern District
of Pennsylvania denied the shipowner's claim for Ryan indemnifica-
tion because the parties' agreement contained an express dis-
claimer.169 Under the terms of the disclaimer, if the unseaworthiness
of the vessel contributed jointly with the stevedore-contractor's negli-
gence to cause the longshoreman's injury, the shipowner waived in-
demnity unless it was shown that the stevedoi'e-contractor could have
avoided the injury through the exercise of due diligence.170 According
to the court, because the stevedore-contractor had no such opportu-
nity here, the disclaimer was enforced. 7 '
2. Defenses to Ryan Indemnity
In Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co.172 the
Supreme Court established a defense to Ryan indemnity for steve-
dore-contractors. In that case, the plaintiff longshoreman was injured
when a piece of wood struck him after it fell from the top of a tempo-
rary winch shelter.173 The longshoreman sued the shipowner on
claims of negligence and unseaworthiness, and he recovered dam-
ages. 174 The shipowner, in turn, claimed a right to indemnification
164. David Crystal, Inc. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 339 F.2d 295, 300 (2d Cir. 1964).
165. See id.
166. 379 F. Supp. 1131 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
167. See id. at 1132.
168. See id. at 1134.
169. See id. at 1142.
170. See id. at 1139. The express disclaimer stated:
The Contractor shall not be responsible to the Government for and does not
agree to hold the Government harmless from... bodily injury to or death of
persons: (1) If the unseaworthiness of the vessel or failure or defect of the
gear or equipment furnished by the Government contributed jointly with the
fault or negligence of the Contractor in causing ... injury or death, and the
Contractor, its officers, agents, and employees, by the exercise of due dili-
gence, could not have discovered such unseaworthiness or defect of gear or
equipment,, or 'through the exercise of due diligence could not otherwise
have avoided such damage, injury, or death.
Id.
171. See id. at 1140-41.
172. 355 U.S. 563 (1958).
173. See id. at 565-66.
174. See id. at 564.
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from the stevedore-contractor for the damages the shipowner paid to
the longshoreman. 175 The district court directed a verdict for the ste-
vedore-contractor; 176 the Second Circuit affirmed. 1" On appeal, the
Supreme Court created an ambiguous standard under which steve-
dore-contractors could defend themselves against shipowners' claims
of Ryan indemnification. 178 According to the Court, if the stevedore-
contractor's performance led to the foreseeable liability of the ship-
owner, the shipowner was entitled to Ryan indemnity "absent conduct
on its part sufficient to preclude recovery."'179 The Court held that, in
this particular case, the standard was not met, and that the stevedore-
contractor had to indemnify the shipowner."s
While the Court did not clearly define the standard of conduct that
would be required to defend against Ryan indemnity, subsequent de-
cisions attempted to fill this gap. In Humble Oil & Refining Co. v.
Philadelphia Ship Maintenance Co.,' 8' the shipowner sued the steve-
dore-contractor for indemnification of damages awarded to a long-
shoreman who was injured on the job.'8 The court held that for
indemnification to be properly applied, the shipowner must affirma-
tively demonstrate that the stevedore-contractor breached its implied
warranty of workmanlike performance, and that the breach caused
the longshoreman's injuries.'83 According to the court, if the ship-
owner's conduct prevented or actively hindered the stevedore-con-
tractor's performance, the stevedore-contractor's breach of the
warranty is excused as a matter of law.'8
3. The Connection Between the LHWCA and Ryan Indemnity
Longshoremen were not forced by the LHWCA to select between
an unseaworthiness action against shipowners and the right to work-
ers' compensation from stevedore-contractors." s The existence of an
unseaworthiness claim resulted in many more longshoremen recov-
eries against shipowners-"third-party tortfeasors"-than land-based
negligence law would have provided." 6 Longshoremen had no tort
action against stevedore-contractors because LHWCA remedies were
exclusive;"8 however, they did not pressure stevedore-contractors to
increase workers' compensation benefits because they could still re-
175. See id
176. See id at 564-65.
177. See id. at 565.
178. See id- at 567.
179. Id
180. See id
181. 444 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1971).
182. See id. at 727.
183. See id
184. See id at 733.
185. See Morton, supra note 78, at 100.
186. See id
187. See 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (1994).
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cover substantial judgments under unseaworthiness claims against the
shipowners. 188 In addition, under Ryan, shipowners received indem-
nification from negligent stevedore-contractors for the judgments
placed against shipowners by longshoremen. 189 Therefore, longshore-
men eventually recovered their damages from stevedore-contractors,
but the recovery process involved two courts and three parties. 190
Further, even though stevedore-contractors' liability for compensation
under the LHWCA was supposed to be "exclusive and in place of all
other liability,"'191 the Supreme Court refused to interpret that provi-
sion to prevent shipowners from receiving Ryan indemnity from ste-
vedore-contractors who breached their implied warranties of
workmanlike performance.' 92 Thus, the stevedore-contractors were
not only liable to the shipowner for breach of an implied warranty
when at fault, but they were also liable to the longshoremen for work-
ers' compensation regardless of fault.193 Commentators criticized this
"indemnity triangle" because it created superfluous litigation and un-
necessarily consumed the resources of the courts. 194 Additionally, the
injured workers received a low proportionate recovery when com-
pared with the total costs of litigation. 95
After studying the problems created by Sieracki and Ryan, Con-
gress decided that the money spent on third-party litigation between
shipowners and stevedore-contractors could be better used to com-
188. See Robert M. Steeg, The Exclusivity of Federal Longshoremen's Compensa-
tion After the LHWCA Amendments of 1972, 10 J. Mar. L. & Com. 395, 400 (1979).
189. See Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 134-35
(1956).
190. See Kammer, supra note 138, at 260; see also Kakavas v. Flota Oceanica
Brasileira, S.A., 789 F.2d 112, 117 (2d Cir. 1986) (observing that the liability scheme
resulted in "an anomalous and intolerable situation" where a large portion of a long-
shoreman's award ended up in the hands of not only his lawyer, but also the steve-
dore's insurer as repayment of the compensation benefits already received).
191. 33 U.S.C. § 905(a).
192. See Ryan, 350 U.S. at 135 (Black, J., dissenting).
193. See Morton, supra note 78, at 100-01; see also Derr v. Kawasaki Kisen K.K.,
835 F.2d 490, 492 (3d Cir. 1987) (stating that because of the circuitous scheme, the
stevedore not only paid the longshoreman's compensation award, but he also paid the
award made against the shipowner in the form of indemnity).
194. See Samuel A. Keesal, Jr. et al., Shipowners' Liability for Longshoremen Per-
sonal Injuries: The Supreme Court Blocks the "Importation" of Unseaworthiness, 7
U.S.F. Mar. L.J. 67, 72-73 (1994); Roy A. Perrin III, Note, The Return of Section
905(b) Vessel Negligence Claims to the Realm of Traditional Maritime Torts:
Richendollar v. Diamond M. Drilling Company, Inc., 12 Tul. Mar. L.J. 405, 407-08
(1988); see also David W. Robertson, Current Problems in Seamen's Remedies: Sea-
man Status, Relationship Between Jones Act and LHWCA, and Unseaworthiness Ac-
tions by Workers Not Covered by LHWCA, 45 La. L. Rev. 875, 900 (1985) (noting that
the result of Sieracki and Ryan "was to expose the employer of workers covered by
LHWCA to full tort liability in most cases in which unseaworthiness could be shown,
despite the Act's provision for workers' compensation as the employer's exclusive
liability").
195. See H.R. Rep. No. 92-1441, at 5 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698,
4702.
1628 [Vol. 67
1999] RYAN INDEMNITY & COMPARATIVE FAULT
pensate injured workers. 196 Congress believed that the stevedore-con-
tractor's warranty of workmanlike performance and the shipowner's
warranty of seaworthiness "did not offer the compensating factors [of]
a legislatively established workmen's compensation system. '97
B. The Repeal of Ryan for Longshoremen
In 1972, Congress ended this triangular liability. Congress, through
amendment of the LHWCA, eliminated the doctrine of unseaworthi-
ness to longshoremen and the remedy of indemnification to shipown-
ers.1 98  The amendments created a compromise between the
competing interests of shipowners, stevedore-contractors, and long-
shoremen. Under the amendments, longshoremen and shipowners
could no longer invoke the remedies available to them under Sieracki
and Ryan, namely, unseaworthiness and indemnification. I" Further,
the amendments gave longshoremen a negligence cause of action
against shipowners, and increased longshoremen's workers' compen-
sation benefits."0
According to the House committee reports, the purpose of the 1972
amendments was to create an effective workers' compensation pro-
196. See id., reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4702.
197. James M. Hazen & John M. Toriello, Longshoremen's Personal Injury Actions
Under the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensa-
tion Act, 53 St. John's L. Rev. 1, 6-7 (1978).
198. See 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1994). The amended LHWCA states:
In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the
negligence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise entitled to
recover damages by reason thereof, may bring an action against such vessel
as a third party in accordance with the provisions of section 933 of this title,
and the employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly
or indirectly and any agreements or warranties to the contrary shall be void.
If such person was employed by the vessel to provide stevedoring services,
no such action shall be permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence
of persons engaged in providing stevedoring services to the vessel. If such
person was employed to provide shipbuilding, repairing, or breaking services
and such person's employer was the owner, owner pro hac vice, agent, oper-
ator, or charterer of the vessel, no such action shall be permitted, in whole or
in part or directly or indirectly, against the injured person's employer (in any
capacity, including as the vessel's owner, owner pro hac vice, agent, opera-
tor, or charterer) or against the employees of the employer. The liability of
the vessel under this subsection shall not be based upon the warranty of
seaworthiness or a breach thereof at the time the injury occurred. The rem-
edy provided in this subsection shall be exclusive of all other remedies
against the vessel except remedies available under this chapter.
Id.
199. See Grice v. A/S J. Ludwig Mowvinckles, 477 F. Supp. 365, 368 (S.D. Ala. 1979)
(observing that the 1972 amendments were not only a compromise enacted to elimi-
nate the unseaworthiness remedy in exchange for increased compensation benefits,
but they also attempted to "overrule... the whole judicially-built SierackilRyan com-
plex which had so effectively nullified the Congressional intent as set out in the exclu-
sivity portions of the Longshoremen's Act").
200. See H.R. Rep. No. 92-1441, at 3, 6 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698,
4700, 4703.
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gram.2°1 The amendments provided injured longshoremen with suffi-
cient compensation, while inducing stevedore-contractors to provide
the greatest measure of worker safety.2 °2 The committee acknowl-
edged that longshoremen had a dangerous job:
It is important to note that adequate workmen's compensation ben-
efits are not only essential to meeting the needs of the injured em-
ployee and his family, but, by assuring that the employer bears the
cost of unsafe conditions, serve to strengthen the employer's incen-
tive to provide the fullest measure of on-the-job safety.20 3
The amendments were also designed to eliminate third-party litigation
between the shipowner and stevedore-contractor. Thus, the monetary
resources of stevedore-contractors, instead of being wasted on litiga-
tion costs, could be more efficiently used to pay higher compensation
benefits.20 4 For example, the maximum LHWCA recovery for disabil-
ity or death was changed from seventy dollars per week to 200% of
the applicable national average weekly wage of the injured worker's
occupation. °5
While increasing the amount of workers compensation that long-
shoremen could receive, Congress also decided that a claim of unsea-
worthiness was no longer an appropriate remedy for longshoremen.
As the House Report noted:
[T]he seaworthiness concept was developed by the courts to protect
seamen from the extreme hazards incident to their employment
which frequently requires long sea voyages and duties of obedience
to orders not generally required of other workers. The rationale
which justifies holding the vessel absolutely liable to seamen if the
vessel is unseaworthy does not apply with equal force to longshore-
men and other non-seamen working on board a vessel while it is in
port.
20 6
201. See id. at 1, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4698-99.
202. See id., reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4699.
203. Id., reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4699.
204. See Keesal et al., supra note 194, at 73. The House committee report stated:
The Committee heard testimony that the number of third-party actions
brought under the Sieracki and Ryan line of decisions has increased substan-
tially in recent years and that much of the financial resources which could
better be utilized to pay improved compensation benefits were now being
spent to defray litigation costs.
H.R. Rep. No. 92-1141, at 5, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4702.
205. See 33 U.S.C. § 906(b) (1994). This average is determined annually by the
Secretary of Labor. See id.
206. H.R. Rep. No. 92-1141, at 6, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4703. In the
Committee Report that recommended the 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA, the
House Committee on Education and Labor noted:
[We] also reject[] the thesis that a vessel should be liable without regard to
its fault for injuries sustained by employees covered under this Act while
working on board the vessel. Vessels have been held to what amounts to
such absolute liability by decisions of the Supreme Court.... which held that
the traditional seamen's remedy based on the breach of the vessel's absolute,
nondelegable duty to provide a seaworthy vessel was also available to long-
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In establishing § 905(b),2 °7 Congress intended to provide longshore-
men with a cause of action against shipowners under the "traditional
principles of land-based tort law."20 8 Congress aimed to eliminate the
uniqueness of certain longshoremen claims, such as the strict liability
included in the unseaworthiness cause of action.2' 9 Under the amend-
ments, then, a shipowner's liability is limited to his actual negli-
gence.21° Congress did not, however, define negligence in the
shoremen and others who performed work on the vessel which by tradition
has been performed by seamen. Under the Sieracki case, vessels are liable,
as third parties, for injuries suffered by longshoremen as a result of "un-
seaworthy" conditions even though the unseaworthiness was caused, cre-
ated, or brought into play by the stevedore (or an employee of the
stevedore) rather than the vessel or any member of its crew. For example,
under present law, if a member of a longshore gang spills grease on the deck
of a vessel and a longshoreman slips and falls on the grease a few moments
later, the vessel is liable to pay damages for the resulting injuries, even
though no member of the crev was responsible for creating the unseaworthy
condition or was even aware of it. Furthermore.... under the Supreme
Court's decision in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan Atlantic S.S. Corp .. the
vessel may recover the damages for which it is liable to the injured long-
shoreman from the stevedore which employed the longshoreman on the the-
ory that the stevedore has breached an express or implied warranty of
workmanlike performance to the vessel. The end result is that, despite the
provision in the [LI-,VCA] which limits an employer's liability to the com-
pensation and medical benefits provided in the [LHWCA], a stevedore-em-
ployer is indirectly liable for damages to an injured longshoreman who
utilizes the technique of suing the vessel under the unseaworthiness doctrine.
Id at 4-5, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4702 (citations omitted).
207. See supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of the
1972 amendments to the LHVCA).
208. Kaye A. Pfister, A Review of Shipowners' Statutory Duty Under Section 905(b)
of the Longshoremen's and Harborworkers' Compensation Act: Does Scindia Require
a Change in Course?, 1983 Duke LJ. 153, 159. As one commentator observed:
The legislative history of the 1972 Amendments stresses the need for encour-
aging safety procedures on the part of both the vessel owner and the steve-
dore. The objective of safety was given as a reason for establishing a
negligence standard on the part of the vessel's interest and for increasing the
compensation benefits to the injured worker. Additionally, the legislative
history of the statute categorically states that the vessel shall not be responsi-
ble for the conduct, acts, omissions, or equipment of the stevedore or the
method in which the stevedoring operations are conducted.
Gus A. Schill, Jr., Recent Developments Regarding Maritime Contribution and Indem-
nity, 51 La. L. Rev. 975, 992 (1991).
209. The House Report stated:
The purpose of the amendments is to place an employee injured aboard a
vessel in the same position he would be if he were injured in non-maritime
employment ashore, insofar as bringing a third party damage action is con-
cerned, and not to endow him with any special maritime theory of liability or
cause of action under whatever judicial nomenclature it may be called, such
as "unseaworthiness", "non-delegable duty", or the like.
H.R. Rep. No. 92-1441, at 6, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4703.
210. One commentator explained why the unseaworthiness cause of action was
eliminated for longshoremen:
Application of the concept of strict statutory liability to LHWCA cases is
inconsistent not only with the relevant case law, but also with the clear intent
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LHWCA, nor did it provide a guideline regarding the acts or omis-
sions of the vessel owner that constituted negligence.21'
The amendments even provided for the unusual situation in which a
shipowner performs as his own stevedore rather than hiring one. In
these instances, the shipowner is responsible for the safety and welfare
of its longshoremen employees.212 As Congress observed, "the rights
of an injured longshoreman.., should not depend on whether he was
employed directly by the vessel or by an independent contractor. 2
1 3
The shipowner-stevedore is charged with actual knowledge of any un-
reasonably dangerous condition or unreasonable risk of damage to
longshoremen.2 14 A shipowner-stevedore cannot claim to have relied
on the stevedore's warranty of workmanlike performance. 1 5 Under
these circumstances, the shipowner is held to a higher standard of care
for the longshoreman's safety. 1 6
Subsequent to the amendments, the Supreme Court recognized the
legislative overruling of Ryan and Sieracki as applied to longshore-
men.217 In Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,21s the
of Congress in enacting section 905(b) to predicate vessel liability on the
shipowner's actual negligence. Such an application would upset the delicate
balance between vessel liability and the stevedore's duty of care under sec-
tion 905(b), and frustrate the compromise effected by Congress in enacting
the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA. The section 905(b) denial of the
shipowners' right to indemnity from stevedores was balanced by limiting the
shipowners' liability for negligence. Because the courts have strictly inter-
preted section 905(b) in refusing shipowners indemnity from partially negli-
gent stevedores, fairness requires that the courts be equally strict in
requiring that vessels be liable only for their own negligence.
Pfister, supra note 208, at 173-74 (footnotes omitted).
211. See Wright et al., supra note 72, at 507.
212. See Canizzo v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 682, 689 (2d Cir. 1978) (Friendly, J.,
dissenting) ("Where... there is no independent contractor, it is part of the ship's duty
to exercise reasonable care to inspect its own workers' workplace, to remove grease
spills, etc. In such a case there is no 'independent contractor' with primary responsi-
bility upon whom the ship may properly rely.").
213. H.R. Rep. No. 92-1441, at 7, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4705.
214. See Pfister, supra note 208, at 169 ("Because [in this situation the defendant] is
both owner and employer, any knowledge chargeable to it as employer must also be
attributed to it as owner." (quoting Robertson v. Jeffboat, Inc., 651 F.2d 434, 436 (6th
Cir. 1981))).
215. See Napoli v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 536 F.2d 505, 508 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding
that "a charge which relieves a shipowner of liability for a dangerous condition which
was 'known to the stevedore or to any of its employees' is clearly inappropriate where
the shipowner, itself, is the stevedore").
216. See, e.g., Fanetti v. Hellenic Lines Ltd., 678 F.2d 424, 428 (2d Cir. 1982). In
some instances, longshoremen are employed directly by shipowners, rather than being
employed by independent stevedoring contractors. The Supreme Court, in Reed v.
The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1963), held that a longshoreman could bring an action
against the shipowner under the LHWCA, even if the longshoreman was directly em-
ployed by the shipowner.
217. See Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 262
(1979) (stating that the 1972 amendment eliminated a longshoremen's claim for un-
seaworthiness and a shipowner's claim for indemnity against the stevedore); Schill,
supra note 208, at 977 ("The result of the statutory prohibition was that the vessel
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plaintiff longshoreman was injured while he unloaded cargo from a
vessel. 219 In determining causation, the district court allocated twenty
percent of the fault to the shipowner, seventy percent of the fault to
the stevedore-contractor, and ten percent of the fault to the long-
shoreman.z ' The LHWCA, however, precluded the longshoreman
and shipowner from recovering any damages from the negligent steve-
dore-contractor.22' The district court reduced the longshoreman's
award by the ten percent attributable to his own negligence, but re-
fused to lower the award by the seventy percent attributable to the
stevedore-contractor's negligence.' The district court, therefore,
held the shipowner liable for ninety percent22 3 of the damages.22' On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that as a result of the
1972 amendments to the LHWCA, the shipowner was liable only for
his share of the total damages.' The Supreme Court, however, re-
versed the circuit court and permitted the longshoreman to recover
ninety percent of his damages from the shipowner. 6 The Court rea-
soned that Congress, through its amendments to the LHWCA, did not
intend to adopt a proportionate fault rule,z 7 because such a rule
"place[d] the burden of the inequity on the longshoreman whom the
[LHWCA] seeks to protect."'  According to the Court, a ship-
owner's liability is not limited to his proportion of fault; he is liable for
all damages that were not caused by the longshoreman's own
negligence.229
The amendments to the LHWCA contained no specific or definite
standard regarding how negligence would be determined. In Scindia
Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos,10 the Court responded and
set forth the appropriate standard. In Scindia, the plaintiff longshore-
man sued the shipowner for injuries the plaintiff received while load-
ing the ship.3 The plaintiff was struck by cargo that fell from a
owner could make no recovery from the injured longshoreman's employer based
upon either the Ryan implied contractual duty, an express contractual undertaking, or
contribution predicated upon tort concepts." (footnote omitted)).
218. 443 U.S. 256 (1979).
219. See id at 258.
220. See idi
221. See id at 262-63.
222. See id at 258.
223. The 90% represented the 20% the longshoreman could recover from the ship-
owner plus the 70% the longshoreman could not recover from the stevedore-contrac-
tor. See id
224. See id.
225. See id at 258-59.
226. See id at 268.
227. See id. at 269.
228. Id at 270 (footnote omitted).
229. See id at 271.
230. 451 U.S. 156 (1981).
231. See id. at 158.
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pallet, which was held in suspension by a winch2 32 that malfunc-
tioned.233 The plaintiff claimed that the shipowner knew or should
have known about the malfunctioning winch and that it did not inter-
vene to prevent the plaintiffs injuries.2 4 First, the Court acknowl-
edged that the legislative history of the 1972 amendments failed to
provide "sure guidance" for their construction.235 The Court then
held that the shipowner's and the stevedore's duties fell into several
categories. First, the shipowner must exercise ordinary care under the
circumstances. 236 For example, the shipowner must have the ship and
its equipment in such condition that an experienced stevedore-con-
tractor, through the use of reasonable care, would be able to conduct
its cargo operations with reasonable safety to all persons and prop-
erty.237 Second, the shipowner has a duty to warn the stevedore of the
dangers existing on the vessel or its equipment that should be known
by the shipowner through the exercise of reasonable care,238 that
would likely be encountered by the stevedore during his cargo opera-
tions, and that are not known by the stevedore.239 Third, the ship-
owner is liable if he actively involves himself with the cargo operations
and thereby negligently harms a longshoreman.240 Fourth, the ship-
owner is liable if he fails to exercise due care to protect the longshore-
man from any dangers they may confront in areas or from equipment
under the active control of the shipowner during the stevedore-con-
tractors' operation.24' Fifth, if the shipowner has knowledge of a dan-
ger or defect that exists during the loading or unloading of the vessel
that the stevedore-contractor cannot or will not correct, then the ves-
sel owner has a duty to intervene by either stopping the operation or
repairing the defect.242
Scindia also held that if the shipowner retains no control over the
vessel, then he has no general duty to supervise or inspect the work of
the stevedoring employees.243 Further, according to the Court, the
shipowner has no duty to prevent the development of hazardous con-
ditions that occur within the area of cargo operations that are assigned
to the stevedore-contractor, "absent contract provision, positive law
232. See id. at 161-62. A winch is a "large wheel turned by a handle or motor and
having attached to its axle a cable or chain, by means of which a load may be raised or
lowered." Webster's Dictionary 1126 (Int'l ed. 1995).
233. See Scindia, 451 U.S. at 160.
234. See id. at 161-62.
235. Id. at 165.
236. See id. at 167.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. See id.
242. See id. at 175-76.
243. See id. at 167.
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or custom to the contrary. '2 4 The Court reasoned that the imposition
of such a duty "would repeatedly result in holding the shipowner
solely liable for conditions that are attributable to the stevedore,
rather than the ship.
245
The enactment of the 1972 amendments to the LI-,VCA, and the
Supreme Court's decisions in Edmnonds and Scindia, signaled the fall
of Ryan indemnity in longshoremen cases. The problems faced by ste-
vedore-contractors under Ryan were eliminated. Nevertheless, Ryan
indemnity has survived in cases where seamen, rather than longshore-
men, are injured. As discussed in part III, the application of Ryan
indemnity to seamen is a matter of continuing controversy.
III. THE CONTINUED APPLICATION OF RYAN INDEMNITY IN
SEAMEN PERSONAL INJURY CASES
When a seaman raises only an unseaworthiness claim against a ship-
owner, there is general agreement among circuit courts that the ship-
owner may receive indemnification from the stevedore-contractor.246
244. Id. at 172.
245. Id. at 169. The Court supported its reasoning by citing to Hurst v. Triad Ship-
ping Co., 554 F.2d 1237 (3d Cir. 1977). In Hurst, the Third Circuit observed that the
"creation of a shipowner's duty to oversee the stevedore's activity and ensure the
safety of longshoremen would . . .saddle the shipowner with precisely the sort of
nondelegable duty that Congress sought to eliminate by amending section 905(b)." Id.
at 1249-50 n.35.
Justice Brennan offered his own opinion in Scindia regarding the duties that should
be imposed on the vessel owner:
My views are that under the 1972 Amendments: (1) a shipowner has a gen-
eral duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances; (2) in exercis-
ing reasonable care, the shipowner must take reasonable steps to determine
whether the ship's equipment is safe before turning that equipment over to
the stevedore; (3) the shipowner has a duty to inspect the equipment turned
over to the stevedore or to supervise the stevedore if a custom, contract
provision, law or regulation creates either of those duties; and (4) if the ship-
owner has actual knowledge that equipment in the control of the stevedore
is in an unsafe condition, and a reasonable belief that the stevedore will not
remedy that condition, the shipowner has a duty either to halt the stevedor-
ing operation, to make the stevedore eliminate the unsafe condition, or to
eliminate the unsafe condition itself.
Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 179 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
246. See Knight v. Alaska Trawl Fisheries, Inc., 154 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 1998)
("This and other circuits ... have recognized the continued vitality of Ryan indemnity
in seamen cases."); Fairmont Shipping Corp. v. Chevron Int'l Oil Co., 511 F.2d 1252,
1259 (2d Cir. 1975) ("[I]n our view Ryan, by necessary implication, confirmed the
applicability to maritime service contracts of the hornbook rule of contract law that
one who contracts to provide services impliedly agrees to perform in a diligent and
workmanlike manner."); see also David Ashley Bagwell, Continuing Problems After
the Supposed Demise of Ryan Indeniity in U.S. Admiralty Law, 1982 Lloyd's Mar. &
Com. L.Q. 556, 558 (suggesting that a litigant must satisfy six requirements to be
entitled to Ryan indemnity. A litigant must be (1) a shipowner, (2) that depended on
the expertise of the stevedore-contractor, who (3) entered into a contract, (4) where
the stevedore-contractor agreed to perform services without supervised control by the
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Additionally, courts agree that if a seaman raises a claim solely under
Jones Act negligence, a negligent shipowner cannot receive Ryan in-
demnity from a stevedore-contractor.24 7 The circuit courts are di-
vided, however, on whether a shipowner who is liable to a seaman for
both unseaworthiness and Jones Act negligence should be indemni-
fied by a negligent stevedore-contractor. 48 The Third,24 9 Fourth, °
and Sixth251 Circuits apply Ryan indemnity in these circumstances,
even if the shipowner's fault can be determined proportionately to the
stevedore-contractor's fault. These courts base their reasoning on
Ryan's implied warranty of workmanlike performance that stevedore-
contractors owe to the shipowner, thus negating any concepts of negli-
gence. On the other hand, the Second,2 3 Fifth, 54 Ninth, and
Eleventh256 Circuits have rejected Ryan indemnity and have applied
comparative fault in seamen personal injury cases. This part examines
the split and suggests a solution.
shipowner, and (5) the stevedore-contractor's improper performance of services
foreseeably renders the ship unseaworthy, or brings into play a pre-existing un-
seaworthy condition, (6) which subjects the shipowner to liability regardless of fault);
W. Robins Brice, Solidarity and Contribution in Maritime Claims, 55 La. L. Rev. 799,
806 (1995) ("[Tlhe unseaworthiness remedy is ... still available for seamen .... In
these circumstances, Ryan indemnity is also ... still available .... [Ryan indemnity]
remains a contractual concept, however, based on an implied warranty of workman-
like performance, and is therefore not a contribution or joint and several liability
theory."); Schill, supra note 208, at 993 (arguing that Ryan indemnity is not
"'withered,' as the Supreme Court has given no indication that Ryan has lost vitality
in situations which do not involve an injury within the scope of the Longshore Act"):
Marie R. Yeates et al., Contribution and Indemnity in Maritime Litigation, 30 S. Tex.
L. Rev. 215, 231 (1989) (noting that the warranty of workmanlike performance still
exists under certain circumstances); Lisa Brener Cusimano, Note, Contractual Inden-
nity Under Maritime and Louisiana Law, 43 La. L. Rev. 189, 207 (1982) ("Where the
third party is a non-vessel or the plaintiff is not covered by the act, both express and
implied contractual indemnity are allowed. The general disposition of the courts to
allow indemnification against one's own negligence in maritime contracts remains.").
247. See Knight, 154 F.3d at 1045; see also supra notes 158-60 and accompanying
text (discussing shipowner liability under Ryan).
248. See Knight, 154 F.3d at 1045-46.
249. See Cooper v. Loper, 923 F.2d 1045, 1050-51 (3d Cir. 1991).
250. In Knight, 154 F.3d at 1045, the court cites Farrell Lines, Inc. v. Carolina Ship-
ping Co., 509 F.2d 53 (4th Cir. 1975). Farrell Lines, however, is inapposite as it in-
volves a longshoreman, not a seaman. See id. at 54. Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit
has applied Ryan indemnity in seamen cases even when the shipowner is concurrently
negligent. See Heyman v. ITO Corp., 1992 A.M.C. 2654, 2656 (4th Cir. 1992).
251. See Oglebay Norton Co. v. CSX Corp., 788 F.2d 361, 367 (6th Cir. 1986).
252. See Knight, 154 F.3d at 1044-45; see also supra notes 152-55, 158-60 and accom-
panying text (discussing Ryan indemnity and the implied warranty of workmanlike
performance).
253. See Black v. Red Star Towing & Transp. Co., 860 F.2d 30, 34 (2d Cir. 1988).
254. See Loose v. Offshore Navigation, Inc., 670 F.2d 493, 501-02 (5th Cir. 1982).
255. See Knight, 154 F.3d at 1046.
256. See Smith & Kelly Co. v. S/S Concordia TADJ, 718 F.2d 1022, 1028 (11th Cir.
1983).
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A. Arguments for Preserving Ryan Indemnity
The purpose of Ryan indemnity is to place liability upon the party
who is in the best position to prevent accidents and reduce the risk of
harm.57 This policy "serves to allocate risks among those segments of
the enterprise best able to minimize the particular risk involved."" 8
The justification for the policy is straightforward: shipowners should
not be liable for harm they could not have prevented through the ex-
ercise of reasonable care. 59 Further, the doctrine assures that steve-
dore-contractors will feel the sting of their conduct; otherwise, they
would have no legal incentive to mend their negligent behavior. In-
deed, seamen's work is no longer what it used to be.2" In early times,
shipowners and seamen could be expected to fully master every aspect
of the ship.26' Stevedoring, however, has become its own specialty
area of practice, with concerns and problems unique to its field." z
What may be special to the seaman or shipowner is ordinary to the
stevedore-contractor. Therefore, the stevedore-contractor, while
reaping the benefits of his specialty skills, could also reasonably be
expected to shoulder the costs of any accidents he causes.
In addition, principles of comparative negligence are arguably inap-
posite to the contract relationship between the stevedore-contractor
and the shipowner. Ryan indemnity is not based on tort principles of
contribution, but instead rests on the theory that the stevedore-con-
tractor has an implied contractual duty to render a workmanlike per-
formance.2 6 3 Therefore, even if fault could be proportioned between
a shipowner and a stevedore-contractor, liability stems from the
breach of the implied warranty, rather than the failure to exercise due
care. Comparing fault is inappropriate in a contract-based action
under Ryan indemnity, because indemnification is based upon "an
257. See Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376
U.S. 315, 323-24 (1964); Heyman v. ITO Corp., 1992 A.M.C. 2654, 2657 (4th Cir.
1992); Oglebay Norton Co. v. CSX Corp., 788 F.2d 361, 367 (6th Cir. 1986).
258. Oglebay, 788 F.2d at 365 (quoting Henry v. A/S Ocean, 512 F.2d 401, 406 (2d
Cir. 1975)).
259. See generally Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124,
134-35 (1956) ("[Tlhe contractor, as the warrantor of its own services, cannot use the
shipowner's failure to discover and correct the contractor's own breach of warranty as
a defense.").
260. See Marshall v. Manese, 85 F.2d 944, 945-46 (4th Cir. 1936).
261. See id.
262. See id.
263. See Ryan, 350 U.S. at 133-34; see also Heyman v. ITO Corp., 1992 A.M.C.
2654, 2657 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding that a shipowner was entitled to Ryan indemnity
when the ship's officer was injured because the loading stevedore negligently oper-
ated its equipment); Cooper v. Loper, 923 F.2d 1045, 1051 (3d Cir. 1991) (concluding
that a shipowner should receive full indemnity because the stevedore-contractor
breached its duty of workmanlike performance through the conduct of its employees);
Oglebay, 788 F.2d at 367 (holding that the shipowner was entitled to Ryan indemnity
because the stevedore-contractor breached its warranty of workmanlike
performance).
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agreement between the shipowner and stevedore and is not necessar-
ily affected or defeated by the shipowner's negligence, whether active
or passive, primary or secondary." 2" Thus, proponents of Ryan in-
demnity suggest, if the stevedore-contractor breaches its warranty, a
shipowner is entitled to full indemnity from the stevedore-
contractor.265
Ryan indemnity is not impenetrable. Courts that continue to recog-
nize Ryan indemnity refuse to apply it if the shipowner's negligent
conduct prevented or actively hindered the stevedore-contractor from
performing his duties in a workmanlike manner.2 66 In such instances,
the shipowner was the cause in fact of the accident, and should bear
264. Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S.
315, 321 (1964).
265. See Heyman, 1992 A.M.C. at 2657; Cooper, 923 F.2d at 1051 ("Because Ryan
indemnity rests on the theory that the stevedore has an implied contractual duty to
render workmanlike service, tort principles of contribution do not apply."); Oglebay,
788 F.2d at 365-68 (rejecting the magistrate judge's application of comparative fault);
Dobbins v. Crain Bros., 567 F.2d 559, 568-69 (3d Cir. 1977) (reversing a lower court's
75% to 25% apportionment of damages); Gilchrist v. Mitsui Sempaku K.K., 405 F.2d
763, 768 (3d Cir. 1968) ("The law of indemnity is not concerned with the comparison
or degree of fault of the shipowner and the stevedor[e]."). As the Third Circuit
observed:
The Ryan doctrine is not, however, a precision instrument for allocating the
burden according to the relative amounts of fault, but a rough all-or-nothing
device. Even where the shipowner and the contractor are both at fault,
under the Ryan warranty doctrine indemnity will be allowed wholly or not at
all.
Cooper, 923 F.2d at 1051 (quoting Parfait v. Jahncke Serv., Inc., 484 F.2d 296, 302 (5th
Cir. 1973)).
266. See Heyman, 1992 A.M.C. at 2657; Cooper, 923 F.2d at 1050-51 ("A stevedore
does not impliedly contract to provide indemnity under all circumstances, however. If
a stevedore can prove that the shipowner's conduct prevented or seriously impeded
the stevedore from performing in a workmanlike manner, then indemnity will be de-
nied."); Turner v. Global Seas, Inc., 505 F.2d 751, 753 (6th Cir. 1974) (finding that
conduct sufficient to preclude recovery is "conduct which prevented or seriously ham-
pered [a contractor's] performance of its duty in accordance with its warranty").
Other circuits have similarly defined shipowner conduct that is sufficient to preclude
recovery. See Hanseatische Reederei Emil Offen & Co. v. Marine Terminals Corp.,
590 F.2d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that shipowner indemnification is denied
when the shipowner's conduct "effectively prevents the stevedore from satisfying its
implied warranty of workmanlike service"); LeBlanc v. Two-R Drilling Co., 527 F.2d
1316, 1321 (5th Cir. 1976) (asserting that to deny recovery for indemnification one
must focus on "whether conduct or circumstances of the condition for which Ship-
owner has a legal responsibility seriously impeded or prevented Contractor from per-
forming the job in a safe and workmanlike manner"); Henry v. A/S Ocean, 512 F.2d
401, 407 (2d Cir. 1975) (declaring that indemnification is precluded "only where [the
shipowner] prevented or seriously handicapped the stevedore in his effort to perform
his duties"). But see Western Tankers Corp. v. United States, 387 F. Supp. 487, 491
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (finding that a shipowner's negligence is enough to preclude indem-
nity if he is the "best situated to adopt preventive measures and thereby reduce the
likelihood of injury.., from the dangers caused by the unsafe berth"); see also supra
notes 179, 184 and accompanying text (discussing defenses to Ryan indemnity).
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the costs of its misconduct. 267 The court must weigh the fault with
respect to the stevedore-contractor's breach of the warranty of work-
manlike performance, instead of weighing fault with respect to the
seaman's personal injury.216 If the court finds that the shipowner's
conduct prevented the stevedore-contractor from performing its du-
ties in a workmanlike manner, then the shipowner's right to indemni-
fication may be revoked. Thus, Ryan indemnity, which may at first
appear to be an unyielding rule, does bend to serve admiralty inter-
ests. One of the fundamental tenets of admiralty law is the protection
of seamen. The Ryan indemnity rule is flexible enough to extract
damages from the party that caused the harm, while firm enough to
encourage all parties to exercise reasonable care.
B. Arguments for Rejecting Ryan Indemnity
On the other hand, some circuits have rejected Ryan indemnity and
stevedore-contractors' implied warranty of workmanlike performance
when the shipowner is liable under negligence and unseaworthiness
theories.269 Instead, these courts believe, the best way to advance
Ryan's goal of placing liability where it truly belongs is by allocating
damages between the stevedore-contractor and shipowner based on
their relative degrees of fault.270 One of the justifications of Ryan was
"to place ultimate liability on the party who was truly at fault and who
should mend his negligent ways to prevent future injury. '"" A party,
however, has little incentive to take affirmative protective steps when
it is clothed with all-or-nothing indemnity.2' A stevedore-contractor
should not have to pay a shipowner for the injuries the shipowner
helped to create.273 The principles of comparative fault result in "the
just and equitable allocation of damages";274 holding a non-negligent
indemnitor liable would adversely affect this allocation.!s Under this
reasoning, Ryan's rule is an unnecessary limit on the power of courts
to administer justice in seamen personal injury cases. While seamen
267. See Cooper, 923 F.2d at 1051 (finding that although the vessel's deck was slip-
pery, a condition that contributed to the accident, this did not prevent the stevedore-
contractor from fulfilling his warranty, because the slippery deck did not prevent or
actively hinder the stevedore's performance).
268. See Oglebay, 788 F.2d at 366.
269. See Knight v. Alaska Trawl Fisheries, Inc., 154 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 1998);
Black v. Red Star Towing & Transp. Co., 860 F.2d 30,34 (2d Cir. 1988); Smith & Kelly
Co. v. S/S Concordia TADJ, 718 F.2d 1022, 1028 (11th Cir. 1983); Loose v. Offshore
Navigation, Inc., 670 F.2d 493, 501-02 (5th Cir. 1982).
270. See sources cited supra note 269.
271. Knight, 154 F.3d at 1046 (quoting Flunker v. United States, 528 F.2d 239, 243
(9th Cir. 1975)).
272. See id
273. See Smith, 718 F.2d at 1025.
274. Knight, 154 F.3d at 1046.
275. See id. at 1047 (quoting United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397,
411 (1975)).
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will always be protected, this protection should not come at the ex-
pense of innocent or nominally negligent parties.
Courts that reject Ryan indemnity in seamen cases have also found
that the type or degree of negligence is irrelevant when proportioning
fault. Ryan served as a "precursor of modern systems of comparative
fault because it attempted to transfer ultimate legal liability to the de-
fendant truly in the wrong.''276 The rule required an actively negligent
tortfeasor, the stevedore-contractor, to indemnify a passively negli-
gent tortfeasor, the shipowner.277 Its purpose was to mitigate the rule
that disallowed apportionment of damages among tortfeasors.278
Nevertheless, while the principles of "active" and "passive" negli-
gence were more impartial than the rule of nonapportionment, "ac-
tive" negligence and "passive" negligence have never been adequately
distinguished. 79 Comparative fault, on the other hand, obtains the
same objective more precisely and effectively. 80 It is better to deter-
mine the tortfeasors' fault according to the facts presented at trial and
apportion damages accordingly, rather than to completely exempt
passively negligent parties.8 l
276. Loose v. Offshore Navigation, Inc., 670 F.2d 493, 501 (5th Cir. 1982).
277. See id. The Court provided the following jury instructions to describe the dif-
ference between active and passive negligence:
In order for someone's negligence to be active, it must be characterized by
some affirmative act. A person is only passively negligent if he fails to do
something he should have done. When two or more Defendants are found
to be liable to a Plaintiff, and one Defendant was only passively negligent
and the other Defendants were actively negligent, that Defendant who is
only passively negligent is entitled to indemnification.
If indemnity does not apply, you must consider the question of contribu-
tion. Where two or more Defendants are negligent or otherwise at fault, and
this fault contributes to causing an injury, each of the Defendants becomes
responsible for paying a portion of the damages.
Id. at 499.
278. See id. at 501.
279. See id. at 502.
280. As the Second Circuit observed:
When a contributorily negligent seaman is paid maintenance and cure by a
non-negligent shipowner, equity dictates that a third-party tortfeasor should
not bear liability in excess of its proportionate share of fault .... We think
that equity, as well as good sense, should serve to limit the liability of a third-
party tortfeasor to its proportionate share of fault in all cases where reim-
bursement is sought for maintenance and cure. This sort of claim for reim-
bursement is nothing more than a claim for contribution under well-settled
admiralty principles. Of course, total contribution, often called indemnity, is
owed to the shipowner-employer where a third-party tortfeasor is entirely at
fault.
Black v. Red Star Towing & Transp. Co., 860 F.2d 30, 34 (2d Cir. 1988) (citation
omitted).
281. See Loose, 670 F.2d at 502 ("[T]he concepts of active and passive negligence
have no place in a liability system that considers the facts of each case and assesses
and apportions damages among joint tortfeasors according to the degree of responsi-
bility of each party.").
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Ryan indemnity was established by the Supreme Court "to correct
a particular inequity."' The Court's intent was to permit a non-neg-
ligent shipowner to recover any damages from a negligent stevedore-
contractor that the shipowner had to pay to the injured party.3 As
one court has observed, however, "'the more [that a given] case devi-
ates from the original Ryan scenario.... the less justification there is
to apply the warranty."'" Therefore, some circuits reason, Ryan in-
demnity should not be available to a shipowner who is at fault for a
seaman's injury."5 Indeed, the Supreme Court has never held that
Ryan indemnity applies to seamen cases;' only lower courts have
done so.87 Further, seamen cases regularly involve fact situations
that are different than those originally contemplated by the Court in
Ryan. 288 For example, seamen are employed by shipowners, while
longshoremen are usually employed by stevedore-contractors. It
could be reasoned that Ryan's proposition that "the stevedore is bet-
ter positioned to avoid .. .injuries [to longshoremen] during cargo
operations.... does not apply to [the] protection of seamen."2 9 In
such situations, it is arguably more likely that the "apportionment of
liability on the basis of comparative fault best advances the goals Ryan
attempted to achieve ''"2 g and provides "the fairest solution."2 91
Finally, circuits rejecting Ryan indemnity in seamen cases point out
that the general trend in maritime cases is the rejection of an all-or-
nothing approach in favor of a comparative fault system, and that the
application of comparative fault in seamen personal injury cases sim-
ply accompanies this trend.292 Indeed, the Supreme Court, in United
282. Knight v. Alaska Trawl Fisheries, Inc., 154 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 1998)
(quoting United States v. C-Way Constr. Co., 909 F.2d 259, 264 (7th Cir. 1990)).
283. See id.
284. Id. (quoting United States v. C-Way Constr. Co., 909 F.2d 259, 264 (7th Cir.
1990)).
285. See id. The court went on to state that "It]he term 'fault' includes both the
shipowner's negligence as well as breach of the seaworthiness warranty. We do not
mean to include, however, fault derived from the acts of third parties." Id. at 1046 n.5.
286. See Smith & Kelly Co. v. SIS Concordia TADJ, 718 F.2d 1022, 1027 (11th Cir.
1983).
287. See Heyman v. ITO Corp., 1992 A.M.C. 2654,2656-57 (4th Cir. 1992); Cooper
v. Loper, 923 F.2d 1045, 1050-51 (3d Cir. 1991); Oglebay Norton Co. v. CSX Corp.,
788 F.2d 361, 364 (6th Cir. 1986).
288. See Knight, 154 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 1998).
289. Smith & Kelly, 718 F.2d at 1028.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 1029.
292. See id. at 1030; see also McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 212-21
(1994) (holding that a nonsettling defendant's liability in a maritime case should be
calculated according to the jury's allotment of proportionate fault); United States v.
Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 406 (1975) (stating that a vessel owner who is
"primarily negligent does not justify its shouldering all responsibility, nor excuse the
slightly negligent vessel from bearing any liability at all"); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v.
Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 408-09 (1953) (utilizing the rule of comparative fault in a sea-
man's unseaworthiness action against a vessel owner).
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States v. Reliable Transfer Co.,293 held that the allocation of liability
for damages in maritime collision cases should be in proportion to the
relative degree of fault of each party.294 The Court observed that in
maritime law, comparative fault principles have long been applied
without any difficulties in personal injury actions.295
C. Maintaining Ryan Indemnity and Comparative Fault in Seamen
Personal Injury Cases When Shipowners Are Held Liable
for Unseaworthiness and Jones Act Negligence
The best solution to this circuit split is to arrive at the middle
ground: eliminate Ryan indemnity not only when a shipowner inter-
feres with the stevedore-contractor's performance of his duties, but
even when the shipowner becomes actively involved in those duties.
If a seaman successfully raises claims of both unseaworthiness and
Jones Act negligence, then a shipowner should still receive indemnifi-
cation from the stevedore-contractor if the stevedore-contractor car-
ried out his operations without the restraint, regulation, or
management of the shipowner. Shipowners hire stevedore-contrac-
tors to perform their services in a workmanlike manner, and the steve-
dore-contractor's failure to do so might lead to the shipowner being
held liable to seamen. For example, if the stevedore-contractor per-
forms his services in an unworkmanlike manner by bringing unsafe
equipment onto the vessel or producing an unsafe condition such as a
slippery deck, and a seaman is injured as a result, then the shipowner
should be indemnified for any payments made to a seaman as a result.
On the other hand, when the shipowner takes on an active involve-
ment in the stevedore-contractor's operations, and the seaman is in-
jured as a result of both the shipowner's and stevedore-contractor's
negligence, then indemnification is not proper because it is unfair to
the stevedore-contractor. Under these circumstances, the apportion-
ment of damages between shipowner and stevedore-contractor under
the doctrine of comparative fault is more appropriate.
A shipowner could be considered actively involved in a stevedore-
contractor's operations when: (1) a shipowner, through his own in-
dependent acts, places restraints, manages, or regulates the stevedore-
contractor's operations, and a seaman is injured because the ship-
owner did not apply reasonable care to avoid exposing the seaman to
dangers and hazards; or (2) the ship or its equipment is unfit for the
performance of the stevedore-contractor's operations in a safe and
reasonable manner, and the shipowner knows and could have avoided
such defects or hazards existing on the ship at the time of the steve-
293. 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
294. See id. at 411.
295. See id. at 407 ("[Iun our own admiralty law a rule of comparative negligence
has long been applied with no untoward difficulties in personal injury actions." (citing
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409 (1953))).
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dote-contractor's performance. Further, in defining the term "active
involvement," courts could make reference to the standard of negli-
gence that Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos2 96 made
applicable to shipowners.
Certainly, the application of comparative fault in maritime personal
injury cases has been met with skepticism. The Third, Fourth, and
Sixth Circuits continue to apply Ryan indemnity because shipowners
that sue under the warranty of workmanlike performance pursue a
course of action in contract law. Because Ryan's claim is based in
contract and not tort law, these courts reason, the concepts of negli-
gence are inapposite.297 Ryan indemnity, though, was created in 1956.
At that time, comparative fault principles were not applied by circuit
courts to proportion damages between shipowner and stevedore-con-
tractor in the field of maritime law because the Supreme Court had
held that only Congress could enact legislation to determine whether
damages should be proportioned according to fault in maritime per-
sonal injury cases.2 9 In 1974, however, the Court, in Cooper Steve-
doring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc.,2 9 9 held that contribution between
parties who are at fault can no longer be refused in noncollision cases,
including personal injury." Moreover, in Reliable Transfer, the
Supreme Court approved the use of comparative fault principles for
maritime collision cases.30 ' The Court reasoned that comparative
fault should apply to maritime collision cases because it has been ap-
plied to seamen personal injury actions for years.302 The Court stated
that Congress does not necessarily have the final determination on
whether comparative fault principles apply to maritime collision
cases.30 3 In the Court's opinion, the Court is far ahead of Congress in
296. 451 U.S. 156 (1981); see also supra notes 236-42 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the duties owed by shipowners and stevedore-contractors to longshoremen).
297. See Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 132-33
(1956).
298. See Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 285
(1952).
299. 417 U.S. 106 (1974).
300. See id at 110-15. The Court stated that:
[The longshoreman] was not an employee of [the petitioner] and could have
proceeded against either the Vessel or [the petitioner] or both of them to
recover full damages for his injury. Had [the longshoreman] done so, either
or both of the defendants could have been held responsible for all or part of
the damages. Since [the longshoreman] could have elected to make [the pe-
titioner] bear its share of the damages caused by its negligence, we see no
reason why the Vessel should not be accorded the same right. On the facts
... no countervailing considerations detract from the well-established mari-
time rule allowing contribution between joint tortfeasors.
Id at 113.
301. See United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 401-11 (1975).
302. See iL at 407 (stating that an employee's award in damages from the ship-
owner, employer, will be reduced according to the employee's proportionate degree
of fault (citing Pope & Talbot Inc., v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 408-09 (1953))).
303. See iL at 409.
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creating adaptable and fair remedies in maritime law.3 °4 Congress has
left the responsibility of "fashioning the controlling rules of admiralty
law" to the Supreme Court.3 5
It was undoubtedly appropriate for the Supreme Court to create
Ryan indemnity in 1956. Ryan attempted to eliminate the inequity
that a shipowner faced when straddled with the burden of having to
respond to a personal injury claim for unseaworthiness. The reason-
ing in Ryan was that a stevedore-contractor should indemnify the
shipowner because the stevedore-contractor supervised and con-
trolled the operations, and was thus in a better situation to adopt pre-
ventive measures and reduce the likelihood of injury. 6 Nevertheless,
when both the stevedore-contractor and shipowner are in control of
the operations and the fault can be proportioned between both par-
ties, then application of Ryan indemnity's all-or-nothing approach
benefits one party and creates inequity for the other. Because both
the stevedore-contractor and shipowner retain control, each could
have taken preventive measures to prevent the injury to the seaman.
Therefore, in these situations, comparative fault is the more appropri-
ate standard to apply.
CONCLUSION
When a shipowner is liable to a seaman for both unseaworthiness
and Jones Act negligence, circuit courts are split on whether the appli-
cation of Ryan indemnity or comparative fault is more appropriate.
As this Note has proposed, both remedies can still survive and be ap-
plied without conflict. First, the court must determine whether the
shipowner maintained any form of active involvement over the steve-
dore-contractor's operations. If no such involvement existed, then the
shipowner should be able to recover indemnity under Ryan's warranty
of workmanlike performance. If, however, the shipowner was actively
involved in the stevedore-contractor's operations and a negligent con-
dition arose during the course of operations, then fault should be pro-
portioned accordingly between shipowner and stevedore-contractor
under comparative fault principles. This solution synthesizes the mer-
its of both sides of the debate and helps maritime law reach its goal of
uniformity.
304. See id.
305. Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963).
306. See Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376
U.S. 315, 324 (1964); Heyman v. ITO Corp., 1992 A.M.C. 2654, 2656 (4th Cir. 1992);
Oglebay Norton Co. v. CSX Corp., 788 F.2d 361, 367 (6th Cir. 1986).
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